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I. INTRODUCTION 
At seven years old, Maria Isabel Bueso arrived in the United 
States from Guatemala to participate in a clinical trial at the request 
of doctors researching Mucopolysaccharidosis VI (MPS-6)—an 
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uncommon and debilitating genetic disease.1 With complications 
from dwarfism, blurred vision, and spinal cord compression, Bueso 
was not expected to live beyond the age of twenty.2 The rarity of the 
disease also made Bueso’s participation all the more necessary as 
doctors struggled with trial enrollment.3 Yet, with Bueso’s help, 
doctors were able to gain FDA approval for a new medication that 
extended her life span by more than ten years.4 Today, at twenty- 
four years old, Bueso has been recognized for her advocacy by local 
and national legislators and is receiving ongoing treatment through 
her parents’ private insurance.5 
At thirty-three years old, M.K. contemplates the impossibility of 
leaving the tenth floor of a Boston hospital, where he receives treat- 
ment for a rare vascular tumor.6 A software engineer from Morocco, 
M.K. came to the United States as a place of last resort after being 
denied operation in Belgium, Germany, and South Korea.7 He 
turned to Boston after discovering two doctors who would treat him, 
arriving on a tourist and medical visa in 2017.8 With his authorized 
stay expiring, M.K. applied for medical deferred action—an alter- 
nate grounds for permitting him to stay in the United States for treat- 
ment.9 
For Bueso, M.K., and countless others, the United States’ dis- 
cretionary program granting medical deferred action to immigrants 
demonstrating extreme medical need has been a godsend. Where re- 
lief is often not accessible within their own native countries, foreign 




1 Miriam Jordan & Caitlin Dickerson, Sick Migrants Undergoing Lifesaving 
Care Can Now Be Deported, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.ny- 
times.com/2019/08/29/us/immigrant-medical-treatment-deferred-action.html. 
2   Id. 
3   Id. 
4   Id. 
5   Id. 
6 Shannon Dooling, As Feds Reopen Some Medical Deferral Cases, Boston 
Patients Find Hope, WBUR NEWS (Sept. 4, 2019), 
https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/09/04/boston-migrants-react-medical-deferral- 
action-change. 
7   Id. 
8   Id. 
9   Id. 
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States regardless of their status.10 However, when news broke on 
August 7, 2019, that U.S. Customs and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) would no longer review medical deferred action applica- 
tions, the lives of many beneficiaries were put into question.11 With 
little fanfare, USCIS denied and deferred applications to Immigra- 
tion and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—the agency charged with de- 
portation.12 
For beneficiaries like M.K., the life-altering news came from the 
media first: “‘What happen[ed] is I read your article before I even 
saw the letter, and I called a family member to check out the mail 
and surprise, surprise, there’s the letter.’”13 The implications were 
clear. With deportations imminent, the risk of death was essentially 
guaranteed. According to Arizona-based immigration attorney Jon- 
athan Solorzano, deferral of one of his client’s applications to ICE 
resulted in a denial and deportation.14 Solorzano’s client suffered 
from a severe heart condition that rendered him immobile after sev- 
eral surgeries; yet, even with a letter from his cardiologist declaring 
that a return to Mexico would invariably lead to his death, ICE de- 
ported him.15 A few weeks later, Solorzano’s client died.16 
After much criticism, on September 19, 2019, USCIS an- 
nounced it would continue reviewing applications for medical de- 
ferred action.17 Notwithstanding the change in course, the program’s 
hiatus caused much confusion and led commentators to speculate as 
to a discriminatory motive behind the policy change.18 Termination 
of medical deferred action—a small but longstanding program pri- 




10 See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/archive/frequently-asked-questions (last updated Mar. 8, 
2018). 
11 See Madeline Ackley, Potential Deportation of Medically Vulnerable 
Migrants Halted, but Questions Remain, CRONKITE NEWS ARIZ. PBS (Sept. 26, 
2019) https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2019/09/26/medical-deferred-action/. 
12 Id. 
13    Dooling, supra note 6. 
14    Ackley, supra note 11. 
15   Id. 
16   Id. 
17   Id. 
18 See id. 
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questions as to the equal protection violations experienced by bene- 
ficiaries threatened with deportation. 
Part I of this Note provides background on the origins and prac- 
tice of medical deferred action. It also references analogous immi- 
gration policies whose implementation or threatened cancellation 
have been challenged in the courts. Part II identifies the standard for 
an equal protection challenge, pinpointing the presence of disparate 
impact and discriminatory intent behind the Trump Administra- 
tion’s temporary cancellation of medical deferred action. Finally, 
Part III addresses how courts should proceed in analyzing a medical 
deferred action equal protection challenge and the implications of 
relying upon a discretionary, impermanent program. 
 
II. ROLLBACK OF MEDICAL DEFERRED ACTION AND 
ANALOGOUS IMMIGRATION POLICIES 
 
A. Background on Medical Deferred Action 
The practice of deferred action long predates the widely publi- 
cized Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy, or DACA, 
first introduced by the Obama administration in November 2014.19 
The action originates from the use of prosecutorial judgment in pri- 
oritizing certain deportation proceedings over others20 and is defined 
as “a discretionary determination to defer a removal action of an in- 
dividual as an act of prosecutorial discretion” according to U.S. Cus- 
toms and Immigration Services.21 Government regulations have 
deemed it “an act of administrative convenience to the government 
which gives some cases lower priority.”22 Though a grant of de- 
ferred action does not bestow lawful status, an individual is consid- 
ered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to be lawfully 




19 Deferred Action Basics, NATI’L IMMIGR. F. (Apr. 15, 2016), https://immi- 
grationforum.org/article/deferred-action-basics/. 
20 Id. 
21 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10. 
22 Complaint at 6, Irish Int’l Immigrant Ctr., Inc. v. Cuccinelli, (D. Mass. 
2019) (No. 1:19-cv-11880-IT) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14)). 
23 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10. 
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words, USCIS will not pursue removal proceedings against those 
present by way of deferred action.24 
Deferred action stemmed from a practice of the United States 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), DHS’s predecessor, 
in which low priority was given to undocumented immigrants who 
demonstrated extreme hardship upon leaving the United States.25 
Such individuals are known as “non-priority aliens” and would es- 
sentially be given a pass on active deportation proceedings under an 
unacknowledged INS practice.26 This non-priority status evolved 
into the use of deferred action on an ad hoc basis and a discretionary 
relief basis toward specific groups of undocumented immigrants.27 
Pertinent here is the ad hoc basis for deferred action typically 
granted to individuals for humanitarian purposes, such as caring for 
a family member with serious mental or physical illness or obtaining 
medical assistance for a serious mental or physical illness.28 Also 
known as medical deferred action or non-military deferred action, 
the program grants deferrals from deportation for a two-year period 
to undocumented immigrants who show extreme medical need, such 
as cancer, cystic fibrosis, HIV, cerebral palsy, muscular dystrophy, 
or epilepsy.29 
Determinations are made on a case-by-case basis in light of the 
totality of the circumstances and use a similar analysis as that em- 
ployed when considering B-2 visas filed for medical purposes.30 The 
requests are seemingly administered under USCIS’s 2012 “Standard 
Operating Procedures for Handling Deferred Action Requests at 
USCIS Field Offices” for “all requests for deferred action . . . han- 
dled at USCIS Field Offices.”31 After years of practice, the 
 
24 Deferred Action Basics, supra note 19. 
25   Id. 
26   Id. 
27   Id. 
28   Id. 
29 Shannon Dooling, Trump Administration Ends Protection for Migrants’ 
Medical Care, NPR (Aug. 27, 2019, 7:39 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/27/754634022/trump-administration-ends-protec- 
tion-for-migrants-medical-care. 
30 USCIS Re-Opens Previously Pending Deferral Requests, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-re-opens-previously- 
pending-deferral-requests (last updated Sept. 2, 2019). 
31   Complaint, supra note 22, at 7-8 (citing U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 
Standard Operating Procedures for Handling Deferred Action Requests at USCIS 
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applications have undergone a uniform procedure for processing 
with individualized determinations for responses.32 Once submitted 
to the local USCIS field office, the application is assessed by a Field 
Office Director and/or District Director and is ultimately decided by 
a USCIS Regional Director.33 Signing as verification of the enclosed 
content, applicants are expected to provide medical and supporting 
documents such as “proof of identity and nationality, biographic in- 
formation, ‘medical information, evidence of community and famil- 
ial ties and equities, conditions in the requestor’s county of origin, 
etc.’”34 They are also expected to submit fingerprints and are sub- 
jected to a series of background checks completed by USCIS before 
approval.35 
Upon approval, not only are deportation proceedings stayed, but 
immigrants granted deferred action can seek work authorization and 
a driver’s license.36 Because of the stay, rather than amassing un- 
lawful presence, recipients retain the possibility of receiving future 
immigration benefits that would have otherwise been barred under 
8 U.S.C. section 1182(a)(9)(B)(i).37 Other available aid includes So- 
cial Security, retirement, and disability benefits, and depending on 
the state, unemployment insurance.38 Overall, the program offers 
mobility, stability, and relief to sick migrants and their respective 
family members while receiving life-saving treatment.39 
However, on August 7, 2019, medical deferred action was 
placed on a temporary hiatus.40 On that day, USCIS purportedly 
stopped processing deferral requests and pawned the responsibility 
onto Immigration and Customs Enforcement—a shift of duty that 
 
 
Field Offices 3 n.1 (Mar. 7, 2012) [hereinafter USCIS Standard Operating Proce- 
dures]). 
32 See id. at 8. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. (citing USCIS Standard Operating Procedures at 3). 
35 Id. (citing USCIS Standard Operating Procedures at 4-6). 
36 Monique O. Madan & Ben Conarck, Undocumented Immigrants with Se- 
rious Illnesses Had a Lifeline. Now It May Be Gone, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 27, 
2019, 8:13 AM), www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/arti- 
cle234426937.html. 
37 Complaint, supra note 22, at 7. 
38   Id. 
39   Id. 
40 Ackley, supra note 11. 
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implied full execution of deportation proceedings.41 Though the rev- 
ocation was implemented as of August 7, USCIS did not publicly 
announce the change, resulting in a delay in notification to the public 
and ICE.42 In fact, ICE declined to take over the program and denied 
knowledge of USCIS’s plan to discontinue the program.43 
The delay in notice also affected immigrants applying for medi- 
cal deferred action, who received letters that they were “not author- 
ized to remain in the United States”; rather, they were told they had 
thirty-three days to voluntarily leave or await possible forced re- 
moval.44 During this time, people were left in a state of confusion 
regarding their status and their ability to retain treatment; further, 
doctors noted that thirty-three days was insufficient time to transfer 
the patient.45 
Criticism grew from the medical community and Congress on 
what effectively amounted to a death sentence since some of the re- 
quired equipment, such as breathing and feeding tubes, are sparse to 
nonexistent in some of the patients’ home countries.46 On August 
30, Congress delivered a letter to DHS, USCIS, and ICE backed by 
nearly 130 congressional signatories demanding answers and the re- 
versal of “[yet] another cruel action by the Trump Administration to 
attack our most vulnerable immigrant neighbors.”47 Congress gave 
a deadline of September 13, 2019.48 Shortly thereafter, over a dozen 
 
41   Id. 
42   Id. 
43   Id. 
44 Letter from Michael J. McCleary, Field Office Dir., U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to [REDACTED] (Aug. 15, 
2019), https://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2019/08/Re- 
dacted_MedDA_denials.pdf. 
45 Priyanka Dayal McCluskey, ‘Deportation . . . With This Type of Medical 
Condition is a Death Sentence’: Outrage Grows over Federal Policy Change, 





47 Letter from Congress, to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Secretary, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., Ken Cuccinelli, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Servs., & Matthew T. Albence, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t 
(Aug. 30, 2019), https://pressley.house.gov/sites/press- 
ley.house.gov/files/083019%20Deferred%20Action%20Letter.pdf. 
48 Id. 
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state attorney generals signed on to a letter to USCIS and ICE relay- 
ing concerns and questions on how medical deferral requests should 
be made in the future.49 The House Subcommittee on Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties held an emergency hearing on September 12, 
which despite an abundance of testimonial evidence from the vic- 
tims, included little comment from USCIS regarding why the pro- 
gram ended and on whose orders.50 This lack of cooperation resulted 
in a threat of subpoena from freshman Representative Alexandria 
Ocasio-Cortez.51 
In the face of mounting outrage, USCIS announced on Septem- 
ber 2 that it would limit reconsideration to applications pending as 
of August 7 in a second attempt to phase out its role in medical de- 
ferred action cases.52 The announcement amounted to a staggering 
791 pending petitions.53 Subsequently, on September 19, 2019, DHS 
confirmed that deferred action petitions would be processed once 
again by USCIS.54 Notably, petitions were instructed to be scruti- 
nized and granted solely “on compelling facts and circum- 
stances”55—a vague criterion. 
Though the program’s termination only lasted for a month, 424 
people received rejection letters out of the estimated 1,000 that ap- 
ply yearly.56 In Massachusetts alone, an immigration attorney 
 
49 Associated Press, Healey Among State Attorneys General Seeking Answers 
On Immigrant Medical Care Cases, WBUR NEWS (Sept. 4, 2019), 
https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/09/04/ag-maura-healey-medical-deferred-ac- 
tion. 
50 Press Release, House Comm. on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee Ex- 
amined Administration’s Decision to Deport Critically Ill Children During Emer- 
gency Hearing (Sept. 12, 2019), https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-re- 
leases/subcommittee-examined-administration-s-decision-to-deport-critically-ill. 
51 Id. 
52 USCIS Re-Opens Previously Pending Deferral Requests, supra note 30. 
53 Shannon Dooling, Congress Expected To Subpoena ICE, USCIS To Testify 
In 2nd Hearing On Reinstated Medical Deferred Action, WBUR NEWS, 
https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/10/11/medical-deferred-action-immigration- 
hearing-house (last updated Oct. 11, 2019). 
54 Ackley, supra note 11. 
55 Letter from Ken Cuccinelli, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. 
Servs., to Jamie Raskin, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties, House of Rep. (Sept. 19, 2019), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/dem- 
ocrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Chairman%20Raskin%20Letter.pdf [hereinafter 
Letter from Ken Cuccinelli]. 
56 Ackley, supra note 11. 
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calculated a group of roughly forty families that were affected and 
estimated the potential for thousands to be affected nationally during 
the program’s termination.57 Worse yet, as of October, families were 
still awaiting news of approval or denial of their deferral applica- 
tions.58 
In the aftermath, concern stems not only from the month-long 
turmoil that resulted from the policy change, but also from recent 
trends of denying medical deferred action to those who are at risk of 
dying upon deportation.59 The Trump Administration has focused 
on violent offenders rather than the medically vulnerable, imple- 
menting a more rigid and less compassionate policy over the past 
few years.60 As a consequence of the change in policy without public 
notice, Congress is demanding transparency and investigating the 
Trump Administration’s decision.61 
B. The Trump Administration’s Muslim Ban 
Unfortunately, the unannounced revocation of medical deferred 
action is not the first time the Trump Administration has taken fed- 
eral officials by surprise in changing immigration policy with lim- 
ited notice.62 Taken together, it reflects a pattern of targeted 
measures implemented to limit the flow of certain immigrants from 
entering U.S. borders. Case in point, the first policy initiative issued 
on January 27, 2017, concerned limiting the number of refugee pe- 
titions accepted and suspending for ninety days the admittance of 
immigrants from countries predetermined as housing “terrorist 
threats”—a policy infamously known as the Muslim Ban.63 
Under the guise of “protect[ing] the American people from ter- 
rorist attacks by foreign nationals admitted to the United States,” 
Executive Order 13769 held conditions such as warfare, disaster, 
and  civil  disturbances under scrutiny in the name of  safeguarding 
U.S. national security.64 In addition to curbing the admittance of 
 
 
57 McCluskey, supra note 45. 
58 Dooling, supra note 53. 
59 See Ackley, supra note 11. 
60 Id. 
61 Dooling, supra note 53. 
62 Jordan & Dickerson, supra note 1. 
63 Id. 
64 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017). 
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refugees, it placed an automatic ninety-day suspension on the entry 
of individuals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and 
Yemen.65 Countries were chosen based on the following criteria: 
[S]uspension applied to countries referred to in, or 
designated under, section 217(a)(12) of the INA, 8 
U.S.C. 1187(a)(12), in which Congress restricted use 
of the Visa Waiver Program for nationals of, and al- 
iens recently present in, (A) Iraq or Syria, (B) any 
country designated by the Secretary of State as a state 
sponsor of terrorism (currently Iran, Syria, and Su- 
dan), and (C) any other country designated as a coun- 
try of concern by the Secretary of Homeland Secu- 
rity, in consultation with the Secretary of State and 
the Director of National Intelligence.”66 
In short, it deemed the entry of immigrants from countries in 
strife to be extraordinarily suspect. The cited rationale was that the 
agencies needed temporary reprieve from administrative burdens to 
better utilize resources and adopt proper standards for screening for- 
eign nationals.67 The price of administrative convenience, however, 
meant sacrificing the safe harbor and welfare of refugees and foreign 
nationals from Muslim-majority countries. 
What began as one executive order snowballed into further ex- 
ecutive action. Executive Order 13780 was announced in March 
2017, superseding the first order.68 Its effect was to place travel lim- 
itations on Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, North Korea, and 
Venezuela and to restrict entry by refugees lacking a visa or valid 
travel documents.69 The document is itself aware of the protestations 
of religious animus levied against its first iteration. Rather than ig- 
nore the outrage, however, it disputes it.70 Executive Order 13769 
begins with a summary of its predecessor and tactfully mistakes the 




66 Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017). 
67 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017). 
68 Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017). 
69 Id. 
70 See id. 
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refugee petitions from persecuted religious minorities.71 More than 
an attempt at appeasement, the acknowledgment shows the Trump 
Administration’s attempt to prepare for anticipated litigation. 
The order was followed by two revisions by way of Presidential 
Proclamations 9645 and 9723.72 Presidential Proclamation 9645 
was released on September 24, 2017, and notably added Chad, 
North Korea, and Venezuela and removed Sudan from the travel re- 
strictions list.73 More recently, in April 2018, Presidential Procla- 
mation 9723 extended the ban on tourist and business visa applica- 
tions from Libya and Yemen; banned some visas for Venezuelan 
government officials; barred all but student and exchange visitor 
visa applications from Iran; instituted a total ban on immigrant visa 
applications from Somalia; and disallowed travel for North Korean 
and Syrian foreign nationals.74 The latest change in 2020 saw the 
addition of six new countries—Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Myan- 
mar, Tanzania, and Sudan—leading to its additional characteriza- 
tion as an “African ban.”75 
Despite the changes, the anticipated litigation came to pass. Fol- 
lowing the first executive order, suits were hastily filed, and courts 
around the country swiftly blocked implementation of the travel 
ban.76 The second executive order was permitted to take partial ef- 
fect after the Supreme Court decided to review appeals of lower 
courts’ rulings blocking the ban.77 Upon its expiration, however, the 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeals made by the Trump Admin- 
istration.78 
As the adage goes, the third time was the charm. With the deliv- 
ery of Presidential Proclamation 9645 in September 2017, the debate 
 
71 Id. 
72 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 27, 2017); Proclamation 
No. 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15937 (Apr. 13, 2018). 
73 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 27, 2017). 
74 Proclamation No. 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15937 (Apr. 13, 2018). 
75 Sam Levin, ‘Trump is Deciding Who is American’: How the New Travel 
Ban is Tearing Families Apart, GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2020, 6:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/16/trump-is-deciding-who-is- 
american-how-the-new-travel-ban-is-tearing-families-apart. 
76 Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Trump’s Travel Ban is Upheld by Su- 
preme Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.ny- 
times.com/2018/06/26/us/politics/supreme-court-trump-travel-ban.html. 
77   Id. 
78   Id. 
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over constitutionality reached the Supreme Court in Trump v. Ha- 
waii.79 The challenge was brought by the State of Hawaii, U.S. citi- 
zens and permanent residents with relatives seeking to apply for vi- 
sas, and a Muslim non-profit organization.80 The suit objected to the 
travel ban applied to the six Muslim-majority countries on the 
grounds that the travel ban was based on religious animus with in- 
sufficient evidence of national security concerns.81 The challengers 
won at the trial and appellate levels, where the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held that the president abused the congressional 
authority granted to the president over immigration and discrimi- 
nated in issuing visas in violation of immigration laws.82 
In a 5-4 split, the Supreme Court upheld the travel ban on the 
determination that the president acted within the scope of his con- 
gressionally delegated power.83 The decision did not hinge on the 
Establishment Clause claim of religious discrimination; instead, the 
majority merely noted the president’s religiously inflammatory rhet- 
oric as present but not dispositive.84 Greater focus was granted to 
the presidential office in general with Chief Justice Roberts empha- 
sizing that the concern was not over whether to denounce the presi- 
dent’s speech.85 Rather, the issue involved “the significance of those 
statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, 
addressing a matter within the core of executive responsibility.86 In 
doing so, [the Court] must consider not only the statements of a par- 
ticular President, but also the authority of the Presidency itself.”87 
As such, Chief Justice Roberts decided that the travel ban itself was 
neutral and expressed a legitimate basis in promoting sufficient vet- 




79 See id. 
80 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
81 Id. at 2406. 
82 Id. at 2406-07; see also Miriam Jordan, Appeals Court Rules Against Latest 
Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.ny- 
times.com/2017/12/22/us/travel-ban-court.html. 
83 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2421. 
84 See id. at 2417-24. 
85    Id. at 2418. 
86    Id. at 2401. 
87    Id. at 2418. 
88    Id. at 2421. 
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Again, the decision was not unanimous, and a strong dissent in- 
dicated a reluctance by some justices to accept a purely, religiously 
neutral basis for instituting a travel ban.89 In her scathing dissent, 
Justice Sotomayor emphasized Trump’s unapologetic and continued 
verbal attacks against the religion of Islam.90 She determined the 
Trump Administration’s use of national security to be a guise or 
laundered attempts by his attorneys to conceal the discriminatory 
intent of the Proclamation.91 Turning to a recently decided case, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018), she pointed out the Court’s folly—“the [real] 
question [was] whether a government actor exhibited tolerance and 
neutrality in reaching a decision that affects individuals’ fundamen- 
tal religious freedom.”92 Though the Supreme Court upheld the 
ban,93 there is still potential for a case turning on whether there was 
neutral intent behind the decision rather than focusing on potential 
presidential abuse of delegated authority. 
 
C. Termination and Extension of TPS 
Another revelation that came with the Trump Administration 
was that Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations would also 
be in jeopardy. Pursuant to 8 USCA section 1254a, the Attorney 
General may grant lawful presence and work authorization to qual- 
ifying foreign nationals under temporary protected status.94 In prac- 
tice, it is the Secretary of Homeland Security that “designate[s] a 
foreign country for TPS due to conditions in the country that tem- 
porarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or in 
certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the re- 
turn of its nationals adequately.”95 TPS designations are typically 
considered for countries with “[o]ngoing armed conflict (such as 
civil war),” “[a]n environmental conflict (such as earthquake or 
 
89 See generally Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2429-47. 
90 Id. at 2435-38. 
91    Id. at 2439. 
92    Id. at 2447. 
93 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 
1719 (2018). 
94 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2019). 
95 Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last updated 
Jan. 17, 2020). 
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hurricane), or an epidemic,” and “[o]ther extraordinary and tempo- 
rary conditions.”96 Currently, that list includes El Salvador, Haiti, 
Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, 
and Yemen.97 Consequently, TPS beneficiaries are not subject to re- 
moval from the United States, have work authorization, and may 
obtain travel authorization.98 Moreover, such individuals are free 
from detention based on their immigration status.99 
Grants of TPS were common practice across party lines for al- 
most two decades until the Trump Administration threatened to dis- 
continue TPS for many beneficiaries.100 With expiration dates ap- 
proaching, the Department of Homeland Security considered 
whether to keep renewing TPS designations, which typically last an- 
ywhere from six to eighteen months.101 Despite estimates of a $6.9 
billion drop in Social Security and Medicare contributions, Trump 
Administration officials entertained the idea of discontinuing TPS 
for Haiti, Honduras, and El Salvador.102 Threats to terminate TPS 
designations also implicated a drain on public resources through the 
loss of property taxes, home foreclosures, and revocation of em- 
ployer-sponsored health insurance.103 Adding to the economic con- 
sequences of such a decision were social costs. As stated by Ar- 
mando Carmona, a National TPS Alliance spokesperson, “‘[t]hese 
are folks that have been in this country for years. Some have been 
here for almost two decades They work here, they’ve built fam- 
ilies here, they have U.S. citizen children.’”104 
With the loss of TPS imminent, plaintiffs in California filed suit 
in Ramos v. Nielson claiming discrimination as the motivating factor 
 
96   Id. 
97   Id. 
98   Id. 
99   Id. 
100 Nicole Acevedo, Immigration Protections for Some Extended as They 
Fight Trump Admin. In Court, NBC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2019, 6:21 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/immigration-protections-some-extended- 
they-fight-trump-admin-court-n1075291. 
101 Teo Armus, Will Central Americans, Haitians ‘Protected’ by U.S. be Sent 




103 Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1085–86 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
104 Armus, supra note 101. 
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behind DHS’s decision.105 Plaintiffs particularly relied upon alleged 
evidence that the Secretary or Acting Secretary of the Department 
of Homeland Security acted under the guidance of the Trump Ad- 
ministration and President Trump’s animus toward non-white, non- 
European foreign nationals.106 The Court found such evidence to be 
dispositive of an equal protection violation, sharing that the DHS 
Secretary or Acting Secretary was not required to “personally harbor 
animus” if the president’s animus “influenced or manipulated their 
decisionmaking process.”107 
Ultimately, the consistency between DHS actions and the Presi- 
dent’s immigration agenda sufficed for a preliminary showing of an 
equal protection violation, and plaintiffs were granted an injunction 
to continue extending protections.108 The Court first relied upon di- 
rect evidence of the President’s animus, including but not limited to: 
calling Mexican immigrants “drug dealers or users, criminals, and 
rapists”; implementing an absolute ban on Muslim immigration; as- 
serting that all recent Haitian immigrants were AIDS carriers; alleg- 
ing that recent Nigeran immigrants would “never go back to their 
huts” in Africa; referencing TPS-designated countries—Haiti, El 
Salvador, and African countries—as “shithole countries” and invit- 
ing greater immigration from Norway—a predominantly white 
country—; and cautioning Europe of an impending culture change 
from recent immigration patterns which he described as being “a 
very negative thing for Europe.”109 
Supplementing the direct evidence, the Court also found suffi- 
cient circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive.110 Such 
evidence included: frequent exchanges between Chad Wolf, the 
DHS Chief of Staff, and Stephen Miller, senior advisor to the presi- 
dent and strong advocate for terminating TPS; a recommendation by 
the White House National Security Council to Acting DHS Secre- 
tary Elaine Duke to end TPS designations; and a discussion between 




105 See generally Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075. 
106 Id. at 1098. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1105. 
109 Id. at 1100-01. 
110 Id. at 1101. 
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Duke regarding TPS status for Central American countries.111 
Taken together, the court found enough evidence to believe that 
DHS was “largely carrying out or conforming with a predetermined 
presidential agenda to end TPS.”112 
Just as promising was the Eastern District of New York’s ruling 
in Saget v. Trump.113 Following the Northern District of California, 
the Eastern District too found equal protection challenges meritori- 
ous for a preliminary injunction on termination of TPS for Haiti.114 
Direct evidence of discriminatory animus exhibited toward non- 
white immigrants provided the basis for relief.115 Overall, the court 
relied upon the same animus-ridden rhetoric cited in Ramos—par- 
ticularly Haiti-specific comments such as Trump’s asking “‘[w]hy 
are we having all these people from shithole countries come here?” 
and his claim that Haitians “all have AIDS” in a meeting with for- 
mer DHS Secretary Kelly.116 The Eastern District also turned to of- 
ficial discussions between the Oval Office and DHS reflecting an 
intent to end TPS designations for predominantly non-white coun- 
tries to lessen the number of non-white immigrants lawfully present 
within the United States.117 Such conversations demonstrated “pro- 
cedural and substantive departures from the established deci- 
sionmaking process.”118 DHS official Megan Westmoreland sug- 
gested as much, stating: 
“We are concerned how [the Secretary] could find 
Haiti to meet TPS conditions now but find in just a 
few months from now that it no longer does. Do the 
clients really believe conditions will improve over 
the current baseline over the next 4-6 months? Could 




111 Ramos, 336 F. Supp. at 1098-99. 
112 Id. at 1099. 
113 See 375 F. Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
114 See id. at 379. 
115 Id. at 369-72. 
116 Id. at 371. 
117 Id. at 371-72. 
118 Id. at 373. 
119 Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 373. 
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Ultimately, the court relied on proof that “the [DHS] Secretary 
was influenced by the White House and White House policy to ig- 
nore statutory guidelines, contort data, and disregard objective rea- 
son to reach a predetermined decision to terminate TPS and abate 
the presence of non-white immigrants in the country.”120 The White 
House’s influence was uncontested; rather, the government asserted 
that the evidence only allowed for a presumption that termination 
was predicated on countries no longer meeting statutory conditions 
for TPS.121 However, for purposes of the court’s analysis, “[t]hat the 
White House ‘led’ the decision to terminate is contrary to the statute 
and indicates the White House heavily influenced DHS in the deci- 
sion to terminate TPS.”122 
Outcomes such as those in Ramos and Saget suggest a basis for 
equal protection challenges founded upon Trump’s discriminatory 
rhetoric and the influence of his presidential agenda on agencies. 
 
II.  A CASE FOR EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS IN THE 
TEMPORARY HIATUS OF MEDICAL DEFERRED ACTION 
 
A. Availability of Equal Protection Claims to Foreign Nationals 
Whatever the labeling, discrimination based on race, national 
origin, ancestry, or ethnicity stands in violation of equal protection 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.123 Equal protection guarantees, 
as used against federal actors, can be found in the Fifth Amend- 
ment.124 The Due Process Clause provides that no person shall “be 
deprived of life, liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  
law ”125 In other words, the federal government and its agents 
are obligated to treat individuals of like conditions and circum- 
stances the same.126 
 
 
120 Id. at 368-69. 
121    Id. at 368. 
122    Id. at 371. 
123 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
124     Id. 
125     Id. 
126 See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 
(1985) (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands 
that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
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In its simplest form, once a claim is before a court, a bifurcated 
test is applied.127 The first step begins by weighing the proffered 
evidence of discrimination from federal action that allegedly harmed 
the individual.128 The second step then looks to precedent to apply 
the appropriate level of scrutiny for the type of discrimination al- 
leged.129 At a minimum, a legal classification or distinction only 
stands if it “neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect 
class . . . so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate 
end.”130 
Notably, the clause does not refer to citizenship131— rather, it 
refers to “person[s].”132 In general, the Constitution grants protec- 
tions to individuals, regardless of legal status, with its amendments 
delineating a series of negative rights limiting government action 
over certain guaranteed freedoms.133 This pattern is only interrupted 
by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”)134 and 
by references to voting requirements or prerequisites for running for 
office made in the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments.135 
Here, however, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection 
Clause136 (“[N]or shall any state . . . deny to any person within its 




of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike.”). 
127 See Equal Protection, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cor- 
nell.edu/wex/equal_protection (last visited Jan. 19, 2020). 
128     Id. 
129     Id. 
130 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
131 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
132 Id. 
133 See generally David P. Currie, Positive and Negative  Constitutional 
Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986). 
134 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
135 See id.; Rights of Non-Citizens Under the Equal Protection Clause, 
EXPLORING CONST. CONFLICTS, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftri- 
als/conlaw/alienage.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2020). 
136 The Equal Protection Clause is used against the states rather than federal 
government, but it is referenced here for relevance. 
137 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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distinction in citizenship status. The Court in Plyer v. Doe confirmed 
the significance of this lack of distinction.138 
Faced with an equal protection challenge, the Court invalidated 
a Texas law permitting the state to withhold funding from local 
schools enrolling children of undocumented individuals.139 In read- 
ing the Equal Protection Clause, the Court found the operative 
phrase to be “any person within the jurisdiction” of the State.140 Ac- 
cording to the Court, “[w]hatever his status under the immigration 
laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that 
term.”141 If ever there was a need, the Court confirmed that an un- 
documented individual is indeed a person and then discussed 
whether illegal presence in the United States rendered a person out- 
side of the state’s jurisdiction.142 The Court’s answer: a resounding 
no.143 
Presence within a state’s boundaries was enough to consider a 
person within the jurisdiction of the state.144 The Court elaborated 
that, for purposes of equal protection, a person who is subject to the 
state’s laws is sufficiently within its jurisdiction notwithstanding the 
potential for that individual to be expelled for unlawful presence.145 
Thereafter, the Court affirmed that equal protection applies to both 
citizens and non-citizens of the United States.146 Later cases af- 
firmed this idea, though it is worth noting the greater standard of due 
process afforded to those who are legally present in the United States 
as compared to those seeking admittance.147 
 
 
138 See generally 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
139 Id. at 224-30. 
140 Id. at 210. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 211. 
143 Id. 
144 Plyer, 457 U.S. at 214. 
145 Id. at 215. 
146 See id. 
147 See Centro Presente v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 332 F. Supp. 
3d 393, 411 (D. Mass. 2018) (“[T]he foreign nationals here, the individual Plain- 
tiffs, are already lawfully present in the United States and are accorded a higher 
level of due process than foreign nationals seeking admission to the country.”); 
see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien gains ad- 
mission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent res- 
idence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”) 
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Acknowledging that non-citizens benefit from equal protection, 
it is clear that, in the present case of medical deferred action, the 
unequal treatment of immigrants seeking medical refuge in the 
United States amounted to a violation of equal protection. Since Ko- 
rematsu v. United States,148 laws rarely make explicit use of a sus- 
pect class—such as race—on their face, except in cases of affirma- 
tive action policies.149 If a suspect class were used, it would trigger 
strict scrutiny by the courts.150 The facial neutrality of the decision 
to revoke medical deferred action, however, does not leave the pol- 
icy immune from challenge. In fact, it is still subject to an equal 
protection claim, requiring a showing of both disparate impact and 
discriminatory intent for strict scrutiny to apply.151 
Indeed, on September 5, 2019, Irish International Immigrant 
Center, Inc., sued agents of USCIS, DHS, and the president on be- 
half of thirty-three individuals and families representing nineteen 
deferred action applications.152 Of the applicants in the nineteen 
cases, six were Haitian, four were Dominican, five were Central and 
South American, three were African, and one was European.153 The 
complaint filed asserted that the change made by USCIS was “arbi- 
trary, capricious, and based on impermissible animus [in] violat[ion] 
[of] the [Adminsitrative Procedures Act] and the Equal Protection 
guarantees of the U.S. Constitution.”154 The following sections aim 
to provide an equal protection challenge by introducing arguments 
for the existence of both disparate impact and discriminatory intent. 
 
B. Disparate Impact 
Evidence of disparate impact is one of the elements required to 
bring a successful equal protection challenge for a facially neutral 
policy.155 The general impact in this case is clear. Immigrants in this 
 
148 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
149 See id. at 216. 
150 Id. 
151 See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346-48 (1960); Griffin v. Cty. 
Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964). 
152 Shannon Dooling, Civil Rights Advocates Sue Trump Administration Over 
Medical Deferred Action, WBUR NEWS (Sept. 5, 2019, 1:58 P.M.), 
https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/09/05/aclu-lawsuit-medical-deferred-action. 
153 Id. 
154 Complaint, supra note 22, at 4. 
155 See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346-48; Griffin, 377 U.S. at 231. 
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country who were seeking reprieve from potential deportation for 
access to medical care were subjected to possible deportation pro- 
ceedings.156 With petitions numbered at approximately 1,000 appli- 
cations that year, applicants gambled with the ability to securely 
work and drive while they or their family members had serious med- 
ical needs addressed.157 
Notwithstanding the number of submitted applications, what 
made the impact disparate was the greater effect on some groups 
over others. Disparate impact is found where a class of people is 
disproportionately affected as compared to others similarly situ- 
ated.158 This determination is fact-dependent and made on a case- 
by-case basis.159 Data from deferred action applications is not re- 
leased by USCIS, and accordingly, it is difficult to give an estimate 
of the national effect the program’s temporary revocation had.160 
Nevertheless, sufficient anecdotal evidence exists to establish that 
medical deferred action’s revocation targeted specific immigrants 
disproportionately.161 
For example, in the suit filed by Irish International Immigrant 
Center, Inc., only one of the nineteen deferred action applicants rep- 
resented was a European national.162 The other eighteen cases were 
primarily from Latin America and the Caribbean, with three filed on 
behalf of African nationals.163 Moreover, an overwhelming majority 
of Irish International Immigrant Center clients seeking counsel for 
deferred action are people of color from places in the Caribbean, 
Central and South America, and Africa.164 
Though a small sample size, the Irish International Immigrant 
Center clients are largely representative of beneficiaries of a medical 
deferred action grant.165 Medical deferred action recipients are 
 
156 Madan, supra note 36. 
157 Id. 
158 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
159 See generally id. 
160 Shannon Dooling, What’s Ahead for The U.S. Policy on Medical Deferred 
Action for Immigrants, WBUR NEWS (Dec. 31, 2019), 
https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/12/31/medical-deferred-action-immigrants. 
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generally individuals and their relatives with serious, chronic ill- 
nesses obtaining medical care otherwise unavailable in their native 
country.166 Applicants who are successful in getting deferred action 
frequently come from “low-resource countries with high child mor- 
tality and limited access to necessary therapies.”167 
Though the nature of the request is to delay potential removal 
proceedings from unlawful presence, many immigrants with grants 
of medical deferred action enter the county legally on tourist visas, 
seek medical care, and then submit an application for deferred sta- 
tus.168 Yet even the tourist visas on which they come, formally 
known as B-2 visas, are being granted less and less.169 In 2017, ap- 
proximately 6.4 million people entered the United States on a B- 
visa.170 In 2018, that number dropped to 5,708,278 B-1 and B-2 vi- 
sas granted.171 The B-2 visas, relevant here, are primarily used by 
immigrants with medical deferred status to first gain admittance into 
the country.172 According to the U.S. Department of State, B-visas 
are nonimmigrant visas for tourism with temporary admittance 
granted for purposes of “vacation, visit with friends or relatives, 
[and more importantly for the purposes stated here] medical treat- 
ment ”173 
The issue lies less with the overall reduced number of B-visas 
granted, but concerns yet again the disproportionate impact on non- 
 
166 See Jordan & Dickerson, supra note 1. 
167 Emily Pond, Anti-Immigration Policies Threaten Access to Medical De- 
ferred Action, MED. BAG (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.medical- 
bag.com/home/news/anti-immigration-policies-threaten-access-to-medical-de- 
ferred-action/. 
168 Sarah Betancourt, Pressley, Immigration Services Chief Tangle at Hear- 
ing, COMMONWEALTH MAG. (Oct. 30, 2019), https://commonwealthmaga- 
zine.org/immigration/pressley-immigration-services-chief-tangle-at-hearing/. 
169 Natasha Frost & Dan Kopf, What are the Chances of Being Rejected for a 
Travel Visa to the US?, QUARTZ (Aug. 28, 2019), https://qz.com/1696508/what- 
are-the-chances-of-being-rejected-for-a-tourist-or-business-visa/. 
170 Id. 
171 Table XVI(B) Nonimmigrant Visas Issued by  Classification, U.S. DEPT. 
OF ST. 1, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualRe- 
ports/FY2019AnnualReport/FY19AnnualReport-TableXVI-B.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2020). 
172 See generally Frost & Kopf, supra note 169. 
173 Visitor Visa, U.S. DEPT. OF ST. – BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., 
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/tourism-visit/visitor.html 
(lasted visited Jan. 19, 2020). 
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European immigrants. Compared to an overall refusal rate of 32.4% 
in the 2018 fiscal year, African, Latin American, and Caribbean 
countries consistently fared far worse.174 For example, Haiti was de- 
nied at a rate of 67.6%; Chad at a rate of 60.8%; Sierra Leone at a 
rate of 60.6%; Honduras at a rate of 60.3%; Jamaica at a rate of 
54.5%; and Guatemala at a rate of 53.6%.175 In contrast, European 
countries fared much better. Toward the bottom of the list were 
Liechtenstein at 0.0%; Poland at a rate of 4.0%; Luxembourg at a 
rate of 5.2%; Austria at a rate of 5.4%; Switzerland at a rate of 5.5%; 
and Iceland at a rate of 7.1%. 
Moreover, B-visas limit stays to six months with extensions sub- 
ject to approval by USCIS.176 Relative to the number of people 
granted admittance, DHS reported the “rate of suspected overstays” 
in 2018 as a mere 1.22%, or roughly 666,582 “overstay events.”177 
For B-visas in particular, the number of overstays hovered at slightly 
over 300,000 individuals at a rate of 2%.178 Despite the small num- 
ber of visa overstay violators, the Trump Administration has set its 
sights on prioritizing the deportation of the small few whose legal 
visas have expired.179 Unsurprisingly, that prioritization has primar- 
ily impacted African countries under a policy of targeting the twenty 
countries with an overstay rate of over ten percent (a number total- 
ing less than 1,000 people in all but two of the countries).180 Dji- 
bouti, for instance, ranks as the country with the highest overstay 
rate at 44.67%, but only amounts to 180 people; for Chad (the sec- 
ond highest), the 30.78% rate translated to 165 individuals, and for 
Yemen (the third highest), the 28.52% rate translated to 518 indi- 
viduals.181 Because the policy focuses on a country’s percentages 
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P.M.), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/23/us/us-visa-fast-facts/index.html 
177 Id. 
178 Maria Sacchetti & Kevin Uhrmacher, Nations Targeted By U.S. for High 
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rather than the raw number of individuals overstaying their visas, 
the Trump Administration subsequently avoids targeting countries 
such as Canada with 88,000 overstays.182 
The final measure in ensuring a disparate impact from the start 
of a medical deferred action petition is the automatic leniency in ad- 
mittance to the United States granted by the Visa Waiver Program 
(VWP). The program, “administered by the Department of Home- 
land Security in consultation with the State Department, permits cit- 
izens of 39 countries to travel to the United States for business or 
tourism for stays of up to 90 days without a visa.”183 VWP is prem- 
ised on reciprocity whereby U.S. citizens are allowed to travel to 
these countries under similar parameters.184 The Latin American, 
Caribbean, and African countries from which most of the medical 
deferred action candidates come are absent.185 Instead, the program 
includes predominantly white countries such as Australia, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom, among others.186 In other words, “[t]hey are 
mostly rich nations in Europe and Asia.”187 Without the advantage 
of being able to bypass the regular visa requirements for B-2 vi- 
sas,188 nationals from Latin American, Caribbean, and African coun- 
tries are given one less option to access—at a minimum—short-term 
medical care in the United States. 
In sum, the aforementioned evidence cumulatively demonstrate 
disproportionate harm on non-European medical deferred action re- 
cipients. Those with deferred status are primarily immigrants from 
Latin American, Caribbean, and African countries,189 the same ones 
experiencing a decline in B-2 visas granting legal admission to im- 
migrants seeking medical care in the United States and the same 
ones lacking access to the Visa Waiver Program.190 Notably, in 
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conjunction with measures to limit access into the country, the 
Trump Administration has implemented policies to disproportion- 
ately remove non-European nationals with expired visas.191 The 
temporary cancellation of medical deferred action was yet another 
tool used to fulfill campaign promises to prioritize deportation 
(amidst racial-animus ridden rhetoric).192 
 
C. Discriminatory Intent 
Operating in concert with the discriminatory impact evidenced 
above is a discriminatory intent to deport non-European immigrants. 
Similar to disparate impact, discriminatory intent need not be ex- 
plicit in its motive.193 Even a facially neutral statute may be invali- 
dated if its application is invidiously discriminatory.194 The Court 
has made clear that the standard is not that “the necessary discrimi- 
natory racial purpose must be express or appear on the face of the 
statute, or that a law’s disproportionate impact is irrelevant       ”195 
Rather, “an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred 
from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, 
that the law bears more heavily on one race than another.”196 Dis- 
criminatory intent can be inferred from extreme disparate impact.197 
However, in the absence of an extreme effect on one group, im- 
pact alone will not be held as dispositive.198 Rather, the Court must 
look at the amalgamation of impact and other factors.199 It is an in- 
quiry of direct and circumstantial evidence considering such things 
as events leading up to the policy, legislative or administrative his- 
tory, and remarks made by those in the decisionmaking body.200 
 
191 See Sacchetti, supra note 178. 
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193 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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Though the courts rely upon the government’s purported rationale 
behind policy changes in making its determinations in equal protec- 
tion challenges, that deference is not absolute.201 To the contrary: 
[r]arely can it be said that a legislature or administra- 
tive body operating under a broad mandate made a 
decision motivated solely by a single concern, or 
even that a particular purpose was the “dominant” or 
“primary” one. In fact, it is because legislators and 
administrators are properly concerned with balanc- 
ing numerous competing considerations that courts 
refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, 
absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. But 
racial discrimination is not just another competing 
consideration. When there is a proof that a discrimi- 
natory purpose has been a motivating factor in the 
decision, this judicial deference [to the government’s 
decision] is no longer justified.202 
More recently, courts have adopted this standard in analyzing 
administrative bodies’ decisions to terminate immigration programs 
that assist predominantly non-white foreign nationals.203 In the face 
of threatened termination of TPS, plaintiffs brought suit claiming 
discrimination as the primary driving factor behind the administra- 
tive decision to end Temporary Protective Status.204 Of particular 
relevance was the plaintiffs’ alleged proof that decisions by the Sec- 
retary or Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
were guided by the desires of the Trump Administration and that 
President Trump exhibited explicit animus toward non-white, non- 
European foreign nationals.205 The Court addressed the significance 
of this evidence, stating that “even if the DHS Secretary or Acting 
Secretary did not ‘personally harbor animus . . . , their actions may 
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animus influenced or manipulated their decisionmaking pro- 
cess.’”206 
In light of the consistency between DHS actions and the Presi- 
dent’s immigration agenda, the Court found sufficient evidence to 
indicate a potential equal protection violation.207 The direct evi- 
dence of the President’s animus was found in abundance and was 
limited to a non-exhaustive list of comments.208 Such remarks in- 
cluded: describing Mexican immigrants as “drug dealers or users, 
criminals, and rapists”; calling for an absolute ban on Muslim im- 
migration; claiming that recent Haitian immigrants were all carriers 
of AIDS; asserting that recent Nigeran immigrants would “never go 
back to their huts” in Africa; referring to TPS designated coun- 
tries—Haiti, El Salvador, and African countries—as “shithole coun- 
tries” and requesting greater immigration from Norway—a predom- 
inantly white country—; and warning Europe of an impending cul- 
ture change from recent immigration patterns which he described as 
being “a very negative thing for Europe.”209 
Notwithstanding the direct evidence, the Court found that the 
circumstantial evidence would suffice.210 Such proof included: fre- 
quent contact between Chad Wolf, the DHS Chief of Staff, and Ste- 
phen Miller, senior advisor to the president and strong proponent for 
terminating TPS; a recommendation by the White House National 
Security Council to Acting DHS Secretary Duke to end TPS desig- 
nations; and a discussion between White House Chief of Staff Kelly 
and Acting DHS Secretary Duke regarding TPS status for Central 
American countries.211 Given the sequence and timing of these 
events, the Court determined that there was enough evidence to pre- 
sume that DHS was “largely carrying out or conforming with a pre- 
determined presidential agenda to end TPS.”212 
Largely pertinent to the present analysis is not only the discrim- 
inatory remarks evidenced by the Trump Administration, but also 




207    Id. at 1105. 
208    Id. at 1100. 
209 Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1100-01 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
210 Id. at 1101. 
211 Id. at 1098-99. 
212 Id. at 1099. 
158 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:131 
 
 
announced a rational basis standard of review in analyzing a chal- 
lenge to the enforcement of President Trump’s Presidential Procla- 
mation banning entry of Muslim foreign nationals from six predom- 
inantly Muslim countries.213 However, absent considerations of “the 
entry of aliens from outside the United States, express national se- 
curity concerns[,] and active involvement of foreign policy,”214 fed- 
eral district courts in Ramos and Centro Presente found the appro- 
priate standard to be strict scrutiny.215 In other words, the law or 
policy must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling government 
interest.216 
The instant case of revoking medical deferred action more 
clearly resembles that of Ramos and Centro Presente, where: 
(1) there was no indication that national security or 
foreign policy was a reason to terminate [medical de- 
ferred action]; (2) . . . the [medical deferred action 
beneficiaries] are already in the United States and al- 
iens within the United States have greater constitu- 
tional protections than those outside who are seeking 
admission for the first time; and (3) the executive or- 
der in Trump [v. Hawaii] was issued pursuant to a 
very broad grant of statutory discretion whereas Con- 
gress has not given the Secretary carte blanche to 
terminate [medical deferred action] for any reason 
whatsoever.217 
Because Trump v. Hawaii did not concern an equal protection 
challenge to removing immigration status or benefit from those le- 
gally present in the United States, it is inapplicable.218 Thus, upon a 
finding of discriminatory intent—all the more likely given the influ- 
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policy of terminating medical deferred action would likely be sub- 
ject to a strict scrutiny standard of review. 
It need not be assumed that the remarks made by President 
Trump would serve as a basis for the presence of discriminatory in- 
tent behind the termination of medical deferred action. The Com- 
plaint in the medical deferred action suit against agents of USCIS, 
DHS, and the President says as much.219 Paragraph 4 of the Intro- 
duction to the Complaint explicitly names the President’s actions 
and words as the predicate for his administration’s agenda against 
immigrants of color.220 More importantly, the Complaint details 
how President Trump’s sentiments are not an outlier.221 It references 
statements made by Acting Director of USCIS, Kenneth Cuccinelli, 
equating immigrants to “invaders.”222 More telling is the next alle- 
gation: that “just days before USCIS began sending denial letters to 
people seeking deferred action, [Cuccinelli stated] that the Statue of 
Liberty’s famous exhortation to ‘give me your tired, your poor’ re- 
fers to ‘people coming from Europe ’”223 
Much of the direct evidence of racial or national origin animus 
can be supplemented by circumstantial evidence of discriminatory 
motive. Cloaked in facially neutral language, the cited rationales be- 
hind terminating medical deferred action relied on the premise that 
such a termination would curb illegal immigrants’ leeching of U.S. 
resources.224 For example, Cuccinelli falsely asserted that medical 
deferred action beneficiaries generally entered the United States il- 
legally; but in reality, beneficiaries enter on tourist visas, inquire 
into the availability of healthcare, and then apply for lawful status 
under medical deferred action.225 Though Cuccinelli protested such 
allegations, his acts of misinformation led Congresswoman Debbie 
Wasserman Shultz to reproach Cuccinelli and President Trump of 
following a “white supremacist ideology” by enacting policies 
greatly affecting immigrants of color.226 
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Referring cases to ICE also heavily implicated a desire for re- 
moval over a genuine reform in the assessment of medical deferral 
applications. Though claiming that the termination was an effort to 
“focus agency resources on faithfully administering our nation’s 
lawful immigration system,” USCIS shifted the burden onto ICE— 
”the DHS component agency responsible for removing individuals 
from the United States.”227 Legislators protested this move as a 
means of stoking the fears of undocumented immigrants.228 In a let- 
ter to DHS, legislators lambasted DHS for its renunciation of a 
longstanding practice to review deferred action applications; in par- 
ticular, they argued that “[r]equiring . . . prospective applicants [to] 
request this humanitarian relief by applying to an immigration en- 
forcement agency that detains and deports hundreds of thousands of 
immigrants annually, will deter many vulnerable children and fam- 
ilies  from  coming  forward  and  seeking  life-saving   protec-  
tion ”229 
As suggested, there was no evidence of abuse by applicants of 
medical deferred action. According to immigration attorney Tammy 
Fox-Isicoff, “[t]hese cases aren’t our meat and potatoes, they are our 
Hail Marys It’s like the administration is stripping every ounce 
of immigration policy that’s merciful or human.”230 Sudden revoca- 
tion of a “small but necessary” program is further suggestive of an 
underlying ulterior motive.231 
Additional circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent can 
be found in the events leading to the program’s reinstatement. In 
particular, USCIS was reluctant to grant testimony or produce evi- 
dence after repeated requests from Congress.232 Instead, USCIS 
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defended its stonewalling by claiming protection due to ongoing lit- 
igation and deliberative process privilege.233 Limited cooperation 
coupled with USCIS’s insistence that Congress dwells on “a re- 
solved issue”234 led to Representative Elijah Cummings issuing a 
notice of intent to subpoena Acting Directors for USCIS and ICE.235 
Congresswoman Ayanna Pressley commented: 
There will not be full justice and full restoration for 
these families until they have received notifica-  
tion . . . . We understand what the genesis was for 
this because we see what happens in the light of day 
with this administration, one shudders to think what 
is happening under the cloak of night.236 
As found in Ramos, the influence of President Trump’s rhetoric 
on administrative decisionmaking is sufficiently determinative of an 
animus-based motive.237 After some congressional pressure, on Oc- 
tober 30, 2019, USCIS Acting Director Ken Cuccinelli testified be- 
fore members of the House Oversight Committee that it was his de- 
cision alone to revoke the program.238 Taken as true, Cuccinelli’s 
actions still reflect in accordance with the Trump Administration’s 
agenda. From Congresswoman Pressley’s questioning of Cuccinelli, 
it was evident that she suspected the involvement of President 
Trump or his senior advisor Stephen Miller in the decision to termi- 
nate medical deferred action.239 And yet Cuccinelli took the hit: he 
both acknowledged the resulting confusion of USCIS’s decision and 
stood firmly behind the premise that the program lacks a legal or 
regulatory basis, inviting Congress to introduce legislation to imple- 
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Ultimately, nothing operates in a vacuum. In light of other ad- 
ministrative practices—such as family separation, mass deportation, 
and limited healthcare provisions in detention centers—there is little 
to offset the impression that the termination of medical deferred ac- 
tion was an extension of President Trump fulfilling his divisive cam- 
paign agenda.241 In sum, 
[a]ccelerating policy announcements targeting docu- 
mented and undocumented immigrants leave little 
doubt that eliminating medical deferred action, and 
thereby breaking physician–patient relationships and 
causing avoidable deaths, was a symbolic gesture. It 
signifies to the public that these patients’ lives are not 
worth saving. It signifies to the patients that they are 
at the mercy of an inscrutable government agency 
that can suddenly and without explanation issue a 
death sentence.242 
 
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
The applicable standard of review for the revocation of medical 
deferred action is strict scrutiny.243 Though supporters of its termi- 
nation would articulate a rational basis standard of review per Trump 
v. Hawaii, such a standard is best limited to cases concerning na- 
tional security and foreign nationals seeking admittance into the 
country who are not currently present within U.S. borders.244 Absent 
considerations of “the entry of aliens from outside the United States, 
express national security concerns[,] and active involvement of for- 
eign policy,”245 federal courts considering whether the termination 
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determine if such a change in policy was narrowly tailored to a com- 
pelling government interest.246 
With litigation ongoing, the best indicator of the government’s 
proffered interest in ending medical deferred action comes from the 
principal actors in its termination. According to USCIS Acting Di- 
rector Ken Cuccinelli, medical deferred action—a program with 
decades-long use—lacks any legal or regulatory basis and is subject 
to revocation at any given moment.247 Specifically, Cuccinelli took 
the stance that instituting enduring immigration relief, such as that 
provided by medical deferred action, is the province of Congress.248 
The cited rationale for termination resembled this line of thinking— 
namely, that the program’s revocation was an effort to “focus 
agency resources on faithfully administering our nation’s lawful im- 
migration system.”249 
Notwithstanding the facially-neutral interest offered, circum- 
stantial evidence of an animus-driven interest can be inferred from 
“[t]he impact of the official action – whether it bears more heavily 
on one race than another;” “[t]he historical background of the deci- 
sion” and “[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the chal- 
lenged decision;” and “[d]epartures from the normal procedural se- 
quence.”250 In isolation, Cuccinelli’s reasoning is a little suspect. 
However, in conjunction with the Muslim ban, the attempted termi- 
nation of TPS, and the inflammatory rhetoric given on the campaign 
trail and within the Oval Office, the proffered rationale appears pre- 
textual. Given the sequence and timing of these events, there is 
enough evidence to presume that USCIS was “largely carrying out 
or conforming with a predetermined presidential agenda”251 to end 
medical deferred action—a basis for which courts can find an equal 
protection violation.252 
The termination of medical deferred action signaled a sudden 
shift from common practice to fulfill campaign promises of the new 
administration. Consequently, Cuccinelli’s tendered explanation is 
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unconvincing. Even if taken as true, however, courts have dismissed 
administrative convenience as satisfying a standard of strict scru- 
tiny.253 More telling, Cuccinelli never provides evidence that the 
elimination of medical deferred action would help the agency better 
allocate resources. Rather, evidence shows that USCIS receives a 
mere 1,000 applications per year.254 As such, there is little to suggest 
that many resources are being misappropriated for this “small but 
necessary” program.255 
An animus-driven motive will never pass strict scrutiny.256 But 
even in regard to tailoring, Cuccinelli’s argument for adjusting the 
focus of USCIS for administrative ease seems both overinclusive 
and underinclusive. If the concern were with the misuse of resources 
and an abuse of the immigration system, little sense can be made of 
eliminating a program for which (1) the majority of its beneficiaries 
enter legally on a B-visa,257 and (2) there is a small rate of overstay 
events among its applicants.258 Specifically, for B-visa holders, the 
number of overstays hovers at slightly over 300,000 individuals at a 
rate of 2%.259 Rather than showing concern for administrative relief, 
the shift in review of medical deferred action applications to ICE 
demonstrated a prioritization of deportation despite the small num- 
ber of visa overstay violators.260 
This prioritization has been myopic in scope, primarily impact- 
ing non-European immigrants of color.261 A focus on a country’s 
percentages of overstays rather than the raw number of individuals 
overstaying their visas has permitted the Trump Administration to 
avoid targeting countries such as Canada with 88,000 overstays.262 
In other words, a claim for resource conservation fails due to 
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underinclusiveness if overstays from Western nations remain untar- 
geted.263 Pertinent here is the fact that medical deferred action recip- 
ients are generally individuals and their relatives with serious, 
chronic illnesses obtaining medical care otherwise unavailable in 
their native country.264 Beneficiaries frequently come from “low-re- 
source countries with high child mortality and limited access to nec- 
essary therapies,”265 and consequently, a move to eliminate a small 
stream of immigration for life-saving treatment appears overinclu- 
sive under a purported rationale of conserving resources. 
More revealing is the minimal number of immigrants seeking 
medical assistance.266 There is neither a strain nor an abuse of the 
system to warrant such a response from the government. Rather, it 
is tantamount to a death sentence and reflects a disregard for human 
life that does not bear U.S. citizenship. In Ramos, the court distin- 
guished the disruption and hardship created by the removal of TPS 
beneficiaries from the lack of real harm to the public interest if the 
status quo were to remain.267 Though similar, the instant case pre- 
sents greater consequences—rather than a loss of livelihood, the cost 
is the loss of life. 
Courts have acknowledged that foreign nationals with lawful 
presence within the United States are granted a greater level of due 
process as compared to those not already within the nation’s bor- 
ders.268 Moreover, it has been noted that “[a]lthough their stay is 
temporary in nature, the shortening of their time in the United States 
and acceleration of their removal if relief is not granted may consti- 
tute irreparable injury.”269 Though the Supreme Court upheld the 
Muslim travel ban,270 the Court’s 5-4 split leaves potential for this 
case to turn on whether there was neutral intent behind the decision 
as opposed to whether there was potential presidential abuse of del- 
egated authority. Given the lack of national security concerns and 
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the lawful presence of medical deferred action beneficiaries,271 
courts should follow the standard set in Arlington and decline to ex- 
tend deference to an administrative policy motivated by a discrimi- 
natory purpose.272 
Notwithstanding how the courts should rule, Cuccinelli was cor- 
rect in one regard: medical deferred action can be permanently se- 
cured by the passage of new legislation rather than relying on the 
decades-long precedent of using the program through prosecutorial 
discretion.273 Instead of seeking permanence by relying on the 
courts, medical deferred action may best be safeguarded through 
congressional reform. The ease with which medical deferred action 
beneficiaries’ lives were put in jeopardy demonstrates the need for 
stability in receiving life-saving treatment. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand 
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame 
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name 
Mother of Exiles . . . . 
“Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”274 
 
The recent state of immigration policy for those seeking medical 
deferred action displays a blatant disregard for the words engraved 
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on the pedestal of the Statute of Liberty. Contrary to our Constitu- 
tion—written primarily with the guaranteed rights of persons in 
mind—the Trump Administration has seemingly operated with an 
agenda to limit the rights of foreign nationals within our borders. In 
conjunction with the Muslim ban and attempts to end TPS designa- 
tions, the temporary hiatus of medical deferred action review impli- 
cated a discriminatory motive to reduce the presence of non-white, 
non-European immigrants in the United States. The stakes were 
high. With ICE left at the helm of reviewing applications, deporta- 
tion was likely and death imminent. 
Reinstitution of USCIS’s review, though promising, still leaves 
new and returning applicants in a state of duress and confusion as a 
backlog of applications are awaiting approval. Without congres- 
sional action, medical deferred action remains impermanent. De- 
spite the bleak outcome, there is a silver lining: foreign nationals 
have equal protection rights. Moreover, any deprivation of such 
rights resulting in a disparate impact and premised in a discrimina- 
tory intent may be challenged in court. 
